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Richard TapperTRIBE AND STATE IN IRAN
AND AFGHANISTAN:
AN UPDATE
I N SUMMER 1979, the late David Brooksand I convened a conference in Londonon the theme of ‘Tribe and state in Iran
and Afghanistan, 1800-1980’. Each of us had
conducted ethnographic fieldwork during the
1960s in one of the major tribal groups in
Iran, David among the Bakhtiari and myself
among the Shahsevan, and we had both made
extended studies of the histories of these
groups. In 1970-1972, I had also worked with
Durrani tribes people in northern Afghanistan.
The idea for the conference was born in
Tehran in late 1977, as we discussed our reac-
tions to the Festival and Seminar on Popular
Traditions that we had just attended in Isfahan.
The tribes had featured prominently in the
Festival, and it was clear that the Iranian gov-
ernment now considered them to be ‘safe’
enough to promote as cultural curiosities, as
a tourist attraction as well as grist to the eth-
nographers’ mill. It was no longer mentioned
that some tribes had once posed a political
threat to the state. David and I felt that, in
view of the considerable amount of research
that had been done over the last two decades
on the ethnography and history of the tribes of
Études rurales, juillet-décembre 2009, 184 : 33-46
Iran and Afghanistan in the 19th and 20th cen-
turies, the time was now ripe for stock-taking
and generalization, and an attempt at system-
atic comparison within a historical perspec-
tive, both between Afghanistan and Iran and
also with other areas of the world.
By the time of the conference political
upheavals in both countries had given the topic
added interest and contemporary relevance.
There had been the sort of tribal resurgence
that so often in the past had accompanied
such upheavals. Among the initial problems
faced by the new Islamic Republic of Iran
was resistance on the part of regional, ethnic
and tribal minorities. Within the country, sub-
stantial numbers of pastoral nomads settled
over the previous decades had resumed their
former way of life, and tribal leaders long used
to exile in the West had been welcomed back.
In Afghanistan, following the socialist coup in
April 1978, successive governments had failed
to win popular support, and an insurgency of
Islamic and tribal elements was spreading.
Tribes, Nomads, Pastoralism and the State
In planning the conference, we were aware
of two major questions that would need to be
addressed: the definition of ‘tribe’, and whether
tribes could be defined or even discussed
apart from the state – we had both partici-
pated in debates over tribe-state relations,
and were convinced that – at least in these
two countries – any discussion of the nature
of either tribe or state, now or in the past,
must include a discussion of the relationship
between them.
The old anthropological question, ‘What is
a tribe?’ could not be avoided: there was
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34 considerable diversity of opinion, both among
anthropologists and historians, and among
those studying Iran and Afghanistan, not to
mention their subjects, as to what constituted
a ‘tribe’. Moreover, standard anthropological
notions of ‘tribe’ bore little relation to the
groups so labeled in these two countries, or
indeed to the Middle East generally. The clas-
sical model of tribal society in the Middle
East, conforming with Durkheim’s notion
of ‘mechanical solidarity’, was of egalitarian
descent groups. This criterion best fits Arab
tribal societies, where genealogies are partic-
ularly extensive; a classic example is the Rwala,
a ‘tribe’ of some 250,000 souls, though some
even larger non-Arab groups such as the
Bakhtiari (500,000) of Iran or the Durrani
Pashtuns (over 2 million) of Afghanistan have
been called ‘tribes’ on the same grounds.
Many proponents of this view would deny the
term ‘tribe’ to any group without a descent
ideology.
Others, however, saw tribes as essen-
tially territorially distinct political groups and
expected them to be led by chiefs; they applied
the term ‘tribe’ to almost equally large groups
that lacked unifying descent ideologies and
were heterogeneous in origins and composi-
tion, such as the Qashqa’i, the Khamseh or
the Shahsevan in Iran. At this level of major
cultural-political groups of 100,000 or more
people, then, there was disagreement as to
whether the term ‘tribe’ is applicable on the
grounds of culture (a descent ideology) or
political structure (chiefship and/or political-
territorial unity). 1
Another notion that is no part of standard
anthropological definitions but is strongly
entrenched in both academic and administra-
tive discourses in many parts of the Middle
East, is of ‘tribe’ as the political and socio-
cultural dimension of pastoral nomadism, such
that the category of ‘the tribes’ is convention-
ally synonymous with ‘the nomads’. 2 But
there is nothing in either pastoralism as a sys-
tem of production or nomadism as a mobile
way of living that necessarily leads to organi-
zation in tribes, whether defined politically in
terms of territory and chiefship, or culturally
in terms of common descent.
Numerous observers have noted how the
geography and ecology of most Middle East-
ern countries favour pastoral nomadism. The
terrain and climate made large areas unculti-
vable under preindustrial conditions, and suit-
able only for seasonal grazing; and as only a
small proportion of such pasture could be
used by village-based livestock, vast ranges
of steppe, semi-desert and mountain were left
to be exploited by nomadic pastoralists. Such
nomads until very recently numbered tens of
millions, and almost all were organized politi-
cally into tribes under chiefs. Equally, tribes
1. Other writers (such as myself), however, are unwil-
ling to take either extreme position, and refer to these
larger groups (whatever their apparent basis) as ‘confe-
deracies’, locating ‘tribes’ at a lower level of political
structure, that of first or second order components,
numbering at most some thousands of individuals.
Such tribes commonly (but still by no means always)
combine territorial and political unity under a chief with
an ideology of common descent.
2. This notion is held by numerous historians and other
writers, who also assume tribes to be descent groups,
often borrowing from anthropology the term ‘segmen-
tary lineage’. See my comments [Tapper 1990].
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35(defined in political terms) have commonly
also had a pastoral economic base and led a
nomadic way of life.
But an insistence that tribes in the Middle
East were necessarily pastoral nomads, orga-
nized in descent groups, ignores major tribal
groups in Anatolia, Iran, Afghanistan and
indeed several Arab countries, which often
included both settled cultivators and pastoral
nomads and were complex and heterogeneous
in composition. Thus, most of the Pashtuns of
Afghanistan are (and have always been) farm-
ers or traders, with little or no leaning to pas-
toralism or nomadism, and well-known groups
in Iran such as the Qashqa’i, Bakhtiari, Kurds,
Baluch, Turkmen and Shahsevan have been at
least partly settled agriculturalists. Of course,
by conventional anthropological definitions,
many of these groups were not tribes at all,
but ‘chiefdoms’, or even ‘protostates’.
Any coincidence between nomads and
tribes (whether descent-based, or led by chiefs)
was not so much a causal relation as a func-
tion of relations of both with central states.
Settled state administrations intent on regis-
tering and taxing the inhabitants of territories
which they claimed to control have classically
had ambivalent attitudes to both tribespeople,
with their personal allegiance to each other or
to chiefs, and nomads, with their shifting resi-
dence. Many earlier states, however, were
themselves founded on military forces drawn
from pastoral nomadic tribes, often organized
in military units of tens, hundreds and thou-
sands. Rulers have fostered pastoral nomad-
ism in strategic parts of their territories, and
have frequently created tribes, tribal organiza-
tion and tribal chiefs.
Explaining Variation in Tribal Organization
The conference amply justified our hopes for
a diversity of perspectives and fruitful discus-
sion. In the long ‘Introduction’ to the resultant
volume I drew some comparative conclusions
based on a reading of the papers in the light
of developments in Afghanistan and Iran since
the conference. 3
In both Iran and Afghanistan, tribal groups
had been notorious as makers and breakers of
kings, and dynasties of tribal origins had ruled
both countries until well into the 20th century.
Both states had ‘tribal problems’; and the
tribes in each had ‘state problems’. Histori-
cally, tribes and states formed a single sys-
tem: until recently, no state was without tribal
elements, no tribe existed without relations to
at least one state.
Empirical tribal groups in Afghanistan and
Iran conformed to no single pattern of organi-
zation. None of the following were universal
features: pastoral economy, nomadic or semi-
nomadic movements, descent group organiza-
tion, centralized chiefship, egalitarian ideol-
ogy. Nor did conventional images of tribes
conform to a single stereotype. Afghan tribes
were renowned as hardy, independent, war-
like mountain villagers, farming barren fields,
and rigorous if not fanatical in their devotion
to Islam. The tribes of Iran by contrast were
understood to be pastoral nomads, organized
3. See my ‘Introduction’ [Tapper ed. 1983: 1-82]. I
have elaborated some of the main arguments in various
publications [Tapper 1991], which despite its publica-
tion date, was the first draft of some of the argument,
having been written and submitted [1975, 1994, 1997,
2002, 2008].
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powerful and aristocratic chiefs, and notori-
ous for their ignorance of or indifference to
Islam. Both stereotypes contained some truth,
but they disguised a wide range of empirical
variation between the extremes of the power-
ful, centralized tribal chiefdoms of Western
Iran with their broad pastoral bases, and
the independent, hardy, egalitarian Pakhtun
mountain villagers of the eastern borderlands
of Afghanistan.
There had been several attempts to iden-
tify ‘internal’ and ‘external’ factors in these
varied patterns of tribal organization and lead-
ership, and to apply a range of theories of
evolutionary and cyclical change to the tribes
of Iran and Afghanistan.
For instance, in his classic study of
the Basiri tribe of Southwest Iran, Fredrik
Barth made an important analytical distinction
between, on the one hand, the local pastoral
communities (of some 20-30 families) whose
organization and structure were generated by
internal factors such as the pastoral ecology
and economy; and, on the other hand, the
tribe and the Khamseh confederacy of which
it formed a part, a political superstructure
organized by or in response to external factors
such as settled society, neighbouring tribes,
and agents of the Iranian state [1961].
Others showed how competition for pas-
toral and agricultural resources both within
and between local communities led to the for-
mation of rival blocs. Rivalry and conflict were
commonly mediated by independent religious
leaders. Formal political chiefship emerged
only in conditions of surplus production, or
where a dominant chiefly group could be sup-
ported by external resources, for instance by
raids on vulnerable trade routes or wealthy
urban centres, or across international borders.
Alternatively, state rulers appointed or
approved tribal chiefs. Where the state was
weak, it might have to buy the chiefs’ loyalty
with subsidies; where it was strong, it could
demand taxes and tribal military levies. State
control over the tribes fluctuated over time.
Tribal groups, in their turn, could adapt and
integrate, or practice avoidance and – in
Ernest Gellner’s terms [1983] – ‘divide that
ye be not ruled’. A strong state cannot toler-
ate such diffusely-organized ‘jellyfish tribes’
as Malcolm Yapp called them [1983]; in
order to control or destroy them it must first
provide them with a backbone in the form
of chiefs.
At the local community level, the common
form of leadership was that of greybeard
elders, with little power or authority of their
own. Above that level, leaders of tribes and
confederacies displayed some combination of
elements of two ‘ideal types’, ‘the brigand’
and ‘the chief’. The former depended for
authority over his followers on being able to
ensure a flow of booty; the latter was more
likely to inherit his position or to rely on gov-
ernment appointment. A third type of leader
emerged at different historical junctures: the
mullah or Sufi sheikh or pir, whose authority
over his followers was primarily charismatic
and spiritual, though undoubtedly some fol-
lowers were motivated by expectations of
booty, as well as respect for the leader’s holy
lineage. Actual leaders were likely to combine
elements of these ideal types of authority.
The history of tribe-state relations in Iran
and Afghanistan showed evidence of processes
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37of both evolutionary and cyclical or alternat-
ing change. There were instances of state for-
mation among tribes, but also of devolution
or retribalization, for example following the
dissolution of the Kurdish emirates in the
19th century. Cyclical processes too were evi-
dent in the history of tribal chiefly and royal
dynasties in these two countries, conforming
to the well-known and much-discussed model
derived from Ibn Khaldun.
In summarizing the material from Iran and
Afghanistan, I suggested that the most useful
way of conceptualizing ‘tribe-state relations’
was not as an opposition of substantive social,
economic and political structures so much as
an opposition of tendencies, modes or models
of organization, not just analytically distinct
but consciously experienced as a tension within
the tribal groups and states discussed. As
bases of identity and political allegiance and
behaviour, ‘tribe’ gives primacy to ties of
kinship and patrilineal descent, while ‘state’
insists on the loyalty of all persons dwelling
within a defined territory, whatever else their
relation to each other. ‘Tribe’ stresses per-
sonal, moral and ascriptive factors in status,
while ‘state’ is impersonal and recognises
contract, transaction and achievement. The
division of labour in the tribal model is ‘natu-
ral’; in the state model it is complex. The
tribal mode is socially homogeneous, egalitar-
ian and segmentary; the state is heterogene-
ous, inegalitarian and hierarchical.
The opposition between these two models,
their confrontation with each other and with
social reality, creates a tension, a dialectic with
varying resolutions. Thus, whether because of
ecological limitations, state pressures or inher-
ent contradictions, the ‘pure’ tribe is an empiri-
cal impossibility. Most groups that were termed
tribes had some form of segmentary descent
ideology as the basis for political loyalties,
but all used other principles too, to guide
action and association at different levels of
organization. All tribal groups in Iran and
Afghanistan had a territorial dimension, though
they tended to ascribe common descent to all
those who, by whatever means, had acquired
rights in their territory. But there were several
tribes, especially in Iran, which did not even
pretend to an ideology of common descent,
organizing as explicitly political local groups
with a common leadership; in these terms,
they were proto- or ministates within larger,
empire-like states. The strength of egalitarian
ideals varied widely, as did the extent of ine-
quality in practice; even the most egalitarian
tribal groups displayed some inequalities of
wealth (however narrow) and leadership roles
(however lacking in authority). Conflict over
material interests, between rivals or between
rich and poor, was endemic to all tribal groups;
and ‘anti-segmentary’, territorially-based blocs
and factions were regular tribal phenomena.
The ‘pure’ state is similarly impossible.
Citizenship (that is, in premodern Iran and
Afghanistan, subjection to the ruler) is acquired
through a mixture of territoriality and descent.
In other words, there is state within every
tribe, and tribe within every state; state is
partly defined in terms of tribe, tribe in terms
of state. Most empirical tribes and states are
various forms of hybrid, such as chiefdoms,
confederacies or tribal states. Tribal states take
different forms. Every state must boost its
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citizens, by promoting elements of a common
national culture and way of life. The most
powerful symbols in a nationalist ideology
are shared religion and a concept of mother/
fatherland, but insofar as the ideology stresses
common descent or origins (real or fictive,
plausible or otherwise) it resembles a tribal one.
Some states have claimed common descent or
origins for all citizens and sought to deny or
eliminate any internal ethnic differentiation;
but most contemporary states have to recog-
nize minorities, which may be tribal in culture
or organization, though today they are often
termed ‘ethnic’ or ‘regional’ groups or
‘nationalities’. Other states, controlled by one
‘tribal’ (descent-based) elite, may make no
attempt to disguise cultural differences under
a national ideology, rather reserving privi-
leges and power for the dominant tribal group.
Both these modes, the ‘tribe’ and the
‘state’, exist as opposed cultural categories
within the experience of individuals, as well
as in the structure of systems: dyads from
Afghanistan such as khan and khel, qawm and
gund, nang and qalang, resonate with classics
in the anthropological literature such as siba
and makhzen from the Maghreb, gumsa and
gumlao from the Burma Kachin. They are
not descriptive but cultural categories, idi-
oms that are inadequate to explain the fluid
and complex workings of actual tribal socie-
ties, let alone the relations of tribe and state.
Account must be taken of the formation of
‘anti-segmentary’ communities at certain levels
of organization, of the patterns of bloc alliances
among them, and of increasing centralisation
involving hierarchical relations of patronage.
In effect, varying articulations of all three
processes – segmentarity, community and bloc
formation, and centralisation/patronage – pro-
duce the transformations of tribal society that
have been observed. The major variable is the
influence of the state, both as an external
force and as an idea in opposition to the idea
of tribe. The essence of the latter is indeed
kinship and egalitarianism (the basis of a
segmentary lineage system), while the state is
essentially territorial (the basis of communi-
ties and opposed blocs) and centralized (the
basis of patronage). It is in these terms that we
can understand both the variations in actual
tribal forms and the changes that have occurred,
whether we adopt a cyclical (or oscillation)
model of change or acknowledge the appar-
ently irreversible (evolutionary) changes that
have now taken place in the transition from
tribe to state.
The Return and the Transformation
of the Tribes
I reproduce these arguments here, because they
seem to me to have lost little of their validity
in the intervening thirty years. Yet prevailing
notions of Middle Eastern tribes continue to
suffer from some of the misconceptions that
my analysis sought to dispel.
In the mid-20th century, social scientists
of all persuasions expected tribal and ethnic
minorities within contemporary nation-states
to succumb sooner or later to policies of mod-
ernization and national integration, and many
were confident that class would replace eth-
nicity as the major dimension of social and
political identity. Many anthropologists began
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39to regard the study of their traditional subject-
matter – tribal peoples – as an antiquarian
irrelevance, turning instead to the newly fash-
ionable subdisciplines of urban anthropology
and the anthropology of the state.
These expectations and trends were con-
founded towards the end of the century by
the persistence or creative revival of tribal
and ethnic minority identities in virtually all
countries of the world, and by increasing aca-
demic and popular perception of violent inter-
community conflicts as tribal or ethnic in
nature. Sociologists, political scientists, histo-
rians, geographers and others showed renewed
interest in the study of ethnic and tribal
minorities of the ‘Fourth World’ – no longer
the sole preserve of anthropologists.
Not least of the problems involved is the
question of the categories and terms of descrip-
tion and analysis to be employed. Prominent
among such terms have been ‘tribe’ and ‘trib-
alism’. These refer to a category of human
society whose study was once regarded as
largely the prerogative of anthropology, yet
anthropologists themselves have notoriously
been unable to agree on how to define them.
Small wonder then if historians too, and for
that matter political scientists and others inter-
ested in tribalism, have differed widely in
their understandings of the terms.
The initial problem, then – one that is cen-
tral to the discipline of anthropology, even
more central than it is to philosophy – is that,
in our study of human society and culture, we
are constantly faced with the inadequacy of
our technical terms: either they are neologisms,
technical jargon; or we try to give technical,
jargonistic definitions to words borrowed from
popular discourse. The first case, jargon, by
its nature, alienates us from popular discourse.
In the second case, our terms have to fill the
impossible dual role of being both tools and
objects of analysis. Yet successful jargon even-
tually finds its way into popular discourse.
‘Tribe’, ‘tribalism’, ‘ethnicity’ (and one could
add ‘state’ and ‘race’) are problematic cases
in point.
Let me illustrate by quoting reports from
three countries that have never been far from the
front pages of western newspapers since 2001:
1) ‘Attacks on coalition troops [in Iraq]
should be viewed through the prism of tribal
warfare. This is a world defined in large
measure by avenging the blood of a relative
(al-thā’r); demonstrating one’s manly courage
in battle (al-muruwwah); generally upholding
one’s manly honor (al-sharaf).’ 4
2) ‘Tribal tourism is a means of eradicating
poverty and expanding social justice for it
would benefit one of the most deprived social
groups. Deputy head of Iran Tribal Affairs
Organization for Social and Communications
Affairs, Mohsen Ahmadi, elaborated that sell-
ing local handicrafts, artistic works and dairy
products, and renting out tribal tents and lodges
would help diversify the tribesmen’s jobs and
boost their economy... Ahmadi pointed to
migrating tribes who are scattered almost all
across the country as one of the most fascinating
draws for foreign visitors and anthropologists.’ 5
3) ‘At first glance the election commission’s
map of Afghanistan appears to be a colour-
coded layout of the country’s patchwork eth-
nic groups. On closer inspection, it turns out
to be a display of voting results.’ 6
4. Amatzia Baram, New York Times, 28 October 2003.
5. Anonymous, Iran Daily, 20 October 2004.
6. Shoib Najafizada, Agence France Presse Report,
26 October 2004.
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first, the continuing importance of tribes,
tribalism and ethnicity. But they also show
continuing disagreement as to what these
phenomena are. In Iraq tribalism and tribal
identity (as marked by violence and masculine
honour) are viewed as at root cultural phenom-
ena; in Iran, the tribes are seen as peaceful,
exotic, pastoral nomads, a tourist attraction; in
Afghanistan, ethnic groups and tribes display
their political nature in voting patterns.
Since the invasions of Afghanistan and
Iraq such references to tribes and tribalism, by
journalists, NGO researchers and seasoned
academics, have multiplied. Viewed overall,
they display the same ambivalences that have
dominated attitudes towards tribes on the part
of both foreign observers and Middle Eastern
urbanites for a hundred years or more. Thus,
the more romantically inclined, who perhaps
idealize the tribes, regard them as the archety-
pal ‘civil society’, in the sense of a refuge
from a failed or oppressive state. Most politi-
cians and political scientists, on the other
hand, view tribes and tribalism as obstacles to
the proper functioning of the state, and in par-
ticular, to the development of ‘civil society’.
Analysts, moreover, are divided between those
who see tribes as inherently egalitarian, if not
democratic, and those for whom tribes are
necessarily feudal, tyrannical and patriarchal,
led by powerful chiefs who impose their will
ruthlessly through armed thugs and threaten
the security of the state.
Any notion that there is a necessary histor-
ical association between tribal organization
and pastoral nomadism is doubtful, either in
Iran or Afghanistan. For these two countries
– and others in the region between the Atlan-
tic and the Himalayas – there is no necessary
association between pastoralism, nomadism,
and tribalism. Many known (and probably
many unknown) groups of pastoral nomads
have avoided tribal organization, as a strategy
to avoid state control. Major tribal societies
numbering millions consist of peasant farmers
and urbanites, with little or no pastoral or
nomadic connections or history. The first
question proposed for discussion – ‘To what
extent [does] the evolution of pastoral eco-
nomic activities in the context of globaliza-
tion allow nomadic practices to still occur and
if this way of life, profoundly shattered during
the past decades [...] eventually contribute to
perpetuate some tribal orders?’ – would seem
of limited relevance to such examples.
Similarly, the notion of tribes as stateless
descent groups may have some validity in
North Africa, but it cannot apply to most
historical tribal groups in Afghanistan, Iran
and beyond.
The ambiguity in discourses about ‘tribes’
– whether they are pastoral nomads or settled
farmers, whether they are chiefdoms or descent
groups, cultural or political, even pro-state or
anti-state – not only divides academics but
obscures (or fuels) current political debates at
national level about the future role of tribes
and tribalism.
Officials – and many academics – have
taken a highly positivist view of tribes, expect-
ing them to be mappable, bounded groups,
with little membership change, and wanting
an exact terminology for classificatory and
comparative purposes. From a government
perspective, even the most autonomous rural
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of organization, and leaders who may be
treated as representatives; if they do not have
these patterns or leaders, they may be encour-
aged to produce them. Some rural and nomadic
populations have avoided government control
and exploitation, and even the attention of
historians, by failing to produce such leaders
or recognizable forms of ‘tribal’ organization.
But government-created ‘tribes’, whose names
may appear in the records as such, may exist
only on paper. Further, tribal names found in
official sources imply a uniformity of socio-
political structure which, in so far as it exists,
may be entirely due to administrative action,
and may disguise fundamental disparities in
culture and in forms of social organization.
A desire to establish a consistent and stable
terminology for political groups has too often
obscured the nature of indigenous concepts
and terms, which are no more or less precise
or specific as regards socioeconomic or cultural
features, degree of political centralization,
level of organization and so forth, than their
English language equivalents such as ‘tribe’,
‘tribal group’, ‘clan’, ‘lineage’, ‘family’. 7 Even
in the most apparently consistent segmentary
terminology, individual terms are ambiguous,
not merely about level, but in their conno-
tations of functions or facets of identity:
‘economic’, ‘political’, ‘kinship’, ‘cultural’.
However, as with equivalents in English prac-
tice, the ambiguity of the terms and the flexi-
bility of the system are of the essence in
everyday negotiations of meaning and signif-
icance. Most of the terms that have been
translated ‘tribe’, such as il, cashı̄ra, oymaq,
qabı̄la, qawm, tayfa (and their plurals), contain
such ambiguities, and attempts to give them
– or ‘tribe’ – precision as to either level, func-
tion or essence, are liable to be misdirected.
A precise terminology may aid comparison,
but is unlikely to explain behaviour or to pro-
vide an adequate translation of local catego-
ries and perceptions.
Such a perspective identifies the categories
‘tribe’ and ‘tribal’ as ideological concepts
and disqualifies them from analytical usage.
Any use of these terms, or any ascription of
a tribal identity, is a political statement that
defines the speaker and their relation to their
audience as much as it defines the group or
individuals so labelled. The same disqualifica-
tion applies to the use of any particular name
for a population. There are indeed strong conti-
nuities represented in tribal names; but their
content (what it means, for example, to be a
Kurd or a Pashtun) changes and differs from
context to context. For the theorist this is
a fascinating field of investigation. For the
policy-maker it is a minefield.
In modern times, the nature of the state in
the Middle East has been transformed, and new
nation-states have been created, with clearly
defined territorial borders and citizenship,
centralized administrations, powerful standing
armies; state institutions have pervaded whole
areas of social, economic and religious life
that were previously not the state’s concern.
In many new nation-states, such as Republi-
can Turkey, Pahlavi Iran, Afghanistan since
1880, and Baathist Iraq, new regimes sought
7. The same applies to the English terms ‘state’ and
‘government’, and their local equivalents (dowlat, hoku-
mat).
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language and sometimes religion, usually those
of the ruling elite and not always that of the
majority of the citizens. The state inevitably
treated as enemies of such ‘national integra-
tion’ and state-formation all minority identi-
ties (tribal, ethnic, religious) that claimed the
primary loyalties of their members. Many such
tribal, ethnic and religious identities also span
state frontiers drawn in colonial times; nota-
bly the large stateless tribal ‘nationalities’:
Kurds, Pashtuns, Baluches and Turkmens.
In Iraq, until the mid-20th century tribalism
and ethnicity were the dominant sources of
identity and organization. The major ethno-
linguistic identities were Arab and Kurd, each
comprising a range of different tribal groups.
Religious allegiances (Shi‘a and Sunni and
the numerous small minorities) often cut
across tribal boundaries. Under the UK-backed
monarchy, then the Baath, Iraq underwent
‘modernization’ and nation building in the
conventional pattern: tribal and ethnic iden-
tities were suppressed and denied. Saddam
Hussein however promoted his own tribal
group, and arming and subsidizing the Sunni
tribes was a significant element in his post-
1991 reorganization, 8 neglected or misunder-
stood by the occupiers long after the 2003
invasion. Tribal groups have largely reemerged,
with sheiks (usually best regarded as elders,
not chiefs) expected to represent their follow-
ers to the new authorities. In the absence of
a credible or legitimate state, especially in the
countryside, tribes have offered identity and
solidarity and all the functions of ‘civil soci-
ety’ and the state, not least law and order.
The tribes have been well organized, well led,
cutting across religious and regional differen-
ces. They had well-tried forms of organiza-
tion that had operated efficiently (and to an
extent democratically) in previous times of
weak state structures.
In the Afghan context, ‘the tribes’ usually
refers to the Pashtuns, who form up to 50%
of the population (some say more, some say
less) and at the same time have a similar or
greater number of fellow tribespeople across
the frontier in Pakistan. Other ethnic groups
in the country have ‘tribal’ traditions, notably
the Shi‘i Hazaras and the Sunni Turkmens
and Uzbeks of the North, while the main
minority, the Tajiks, are non-tribal almost
by definition.
From 1747 until the 1970s, Afghanistan
was ruled by Amirs and Shahs from the
Durrani Pashtuns, who based their power on
paying subsidies to tribal elders, especially on
the frontier with India/Pakistan. If the tribes
supported the government, they were left
to run the villages their own way – this
was broadly true in most of the country,
where, despite an administrative structure of
provinces and provincial and district govern-
ors, feudal lords, Pashtun and non-Pashtun,
controlled local affairs.
The importance of ethnic and tribal identi-
ties in Afghan politics and society has undoub-
tedly increased since late 1970s. After the
8. See A. Baram [1997] ; see also R.L. Taylor, ‘Tribal
Alliances: Ways, Means, and Ends to Successful Stra-
tegy’, Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy, Strategic
Studies Institute, United States Army War College,
2005, available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.
army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=619.
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43Soviet invasion, much of the countryside was
controlled by resistance forces, until the vic-
tory of the mujaheddin in 1989; the subsequent
disastrous civil war of the early 1990s led to
the rise of the Taliban. During the years of
revolution, invasion, occupation, resistance and
civil war, both Afghan governments and for-
eign political analysts insisted that ethnic and
tribal identity was no longer the key factor in
determining political behaviour: rather, we
should look to ideologies and programmes.
Since the late 1990s ethnic analysis has
returned to fashion. The strong identification
of the Taliban with the Pashtun (especially
Durrani) tribes, the frequent occurrence of
apparent ‘ethnic’ massacres by and of the
Taliban, and bitter conflicts between Uzbeks
and Pashtuns, persuaded analysts to dust off
the old maps and once again to discuss ethnic
and tribal identities as determinants of politi-
cal loyalties and conflicts. Since the US-led
invasion in late 2001, political analysis and
government and NGO reconstruction efforts
have sought to take account of ethnic identi-
ties and tribal forms of organization. 9
Thus, Scott Baldauf, one of the most per-
ceptive journalists in Afghanistan at the time,
wrote after the 2001 invasion by US-led forces:
During two decades of war, in the
absence of a functioning central govern-
ment, its duties fell to ethnic or tribal
leaders. Rural Afghans have long looked
to such leaders to settle land disputes,
punish crimes, and get their voices
heard. 10
The Taliban ranks were drawn from
Durrani and other Pashtuns: but they were
openly and ideologically ‘detribalized’ by fif-
teen years of civil war, exile, orphanage, and
religious education. The Taliban saw the
tribalism of the 1980s and 1990s mujaheddin
groups as corruption and lawlessness, and
sought to replace it with ‘pure’ tribal values,
which they equated with Islam. A CIA officer
who had worked with Afghan fighters during
the 1980s was reported as saying:
[Local Taliban leaders] are tribal chiefs,
who give themselves Islamist credentials
for foreign consumption, but the real
source of their power is their tribe [...]
Their power does not extend beyond the
influence of their tribe. 11
When the Taliban leaders were removed,
tribal government was resumed in much of
the country, especially the Pashtun areas:
Some experts say this return to feudal-
ism, where warlords gain power by exer-
cising power – relying on weapons and
pragmatism rather than ideologies or
written laws – could endanger the fledg-
ling government. But others argue that,
at least at first, Afghanistan’s best oppor-
tunity for peace is to tap into a tradi-
tional infrastructure that may be unstable
– even brutal – but works. 12
In 2004 Baldauf wrote:
Two and a half years after the fall of the
Taliban, the fight for control of Afghan-
istan continues tribe by tribe and village
9. See for example B. Glatzer [1998] and A. Giustozzi
[2005].
10. ‘Feudal Lords Key to Afghan Peace’, Christian
Science Monitor, December 21, 2001 (http://www.
csmonitor.com/2001/1221/p6s1-wosc.html).
11. S. Baldauf, ‘Key to Governing Afghans: The Clans’,
Christian Science Monitor, June 24, 2004 (http://www.
csmonitor.com/2004/0624/p01s04-wosc.html).
12. S. Baldauf, ‘Feudal Lords Key to Afghan Peace’.




by village. It’s a battle of hearts and
minds, where the enemy – Taliban and
Al Qaeda – know the rules and nuances
of tribal society better than the Ameri-
cans, and perhaps better than some of
the urbanized Afghan officials who now
rule the country.
It’s a battle where alliances are made
and broken over blood relationships and
tribal feuds, rather than adherence to an
extremist form of Islam preached by
Osama bin Laden. The fluid power
struggles present an opportunity for the
US to cast its lot with tribal leaders to
get intelligence and secure local protec-
tion for reconstruction projects. How-
ever, engaging in tribal politics also
risks deepening feuds and undermining
the country’s transition to a more mod-
ern, democratic system based on merit
rather than blood.
‘Tribes are arguably more important than
ever,’ says David Edwards, an anthro-
pologist with extensive experience in
Afghanistan based at Williams College
in Massachusetts. ‘Given the fact that
the present administration neither is very
strong nor has a great deal of legitimacy,
tribal structures have rebounded.’ 13
In Iran, tribal affairs are very different.
Although there have been recent reports of
tribal and ethnic unrest in some remote parts
of the country, such as Baluchistan and
Kurdistan, the armed forces, notably the revo-
lutionary guards, have in effect eliminated
ethnic and tribal politics. Since the revolution
the tribes have been officially redefined as
cultural rather than political groups; as col-
ourful pastoral nomads with kinship solidar-
ity, rather than the political organizations led
by powerful chiefs that they were until the
1920s [Tapper ed. 1983]. The situation now
resembles that which obtained towards the
end of the Pahlavi period, for example at the
1977 Festival of Popular Traditions in Isfa-
han, when the regime celebrated its defeat of
the nomad tribes: tribal cultures were taken
out of their social and especially political
contexts and displayed in public as museum
pieces – a ‘culture bazaar’, as one Iranian
anthropologist described it [Shahshahani 1986].
Now – as then – the tribes are promoted as
tourist attractions; one can find scores of
‘tribal tours’ websites, offering foreigners
nights among the famous groups such as the
Bakhtiari and the Qashqa’i.
Assuming the establishment of strong,
autonomous central governments, will this
domestication of the tribes also be the future
for Afghanistan and Iraq? A big assumption,
perhaps. But what are the processes involved?
In the premodern world, tribal groups in
all these countries had contracts with their
governments, with the state authorities. In
return for a degree of autonomy, and possibly
subsidy, they ‘protected’ main roads and
trade routes; when strong, the tribes also ‘pro-
tected’ cities; the chiefs often settled there.
Before the age of machine-guns, tanks and
aircraft, tribal militias were the equal of any-
thing the government could muster against them
– indeed successful states employed tribal
militias. The 20th century brought new mili-
tary technologies which tipped the balance,
it seemed for good, in favour of the modern-
izing state, leaving the tribes ‘backward’
technologically as well as culturally. But the
13. S. Baldauf, ‘Key to Governing Afghans: The Clans’.
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the Stinger, restored something of the old bal-
ance; and they inspired tribal resistances in
today’s Iraq.
Generally, tribal forces have proved that
they are still hard to beat on their own terri-
tory; but they are amenable to persuasion, to
negotiations of loyalty by diplomatic outsid-
ers. In the contemporary world of nation-
states, whose priorities – whatever the effects
of globalization – still appear to be state-
formation, nation-building and national inte-
gration, tribal and other minority identities are
clearly still perceived as at least potential
threats to the state.
Iran has dealt with these threats, first by
violence (in the 1920s and 1930s), secondly
by denial (in the 1950s and 1960s), and now
by domestication (since the 1970s). That the
domestication is not complete is shown by the
preelection visit to Kurdistan in May 2009
by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamane’i;
in his speeches, while warning the (mainly
Sunni) Kurdish tribes of ‘the plots of the
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